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INTRODUCTION
Scientific innovation is crucial to the prosperity, security, and health of
a nation.1 During the founding years of the United States, political leaders
∗
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1. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Medal of Science and National
Medal of Technology and Innovation Ceremony (Oct. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-National-Medal-ofScience-and-National-Medal-of-Technology-and-Innovation-Ceremony/ (“Science is more essential
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realized the need for such innovation and created the patent law system2 as
a means of protecting American citizens.3 The major goals of the United
States patent law system are to provide the public with cutting-edge
scientific discoveries and to enlighten the public as to how these
discoveries can benefit society.4
In modern America, a substantial amount of patent protection is sought
for inventions relating to the pharmaceutical industry. In recent decades,
the pharmaceutical industry has expanded rapidly as researchers invent
new and more effective drugs and products.5 The average life expectancy
and quality of life of United States citizens has drastically increased in the
past century, largely due to pharmaceutical innovation.6 Nonetheless,
nearly sixty million people die each year, with many of these deaths caused
by problems that pharmaceutical companies are striving to cure.7
In the late 1970s, scientific researchers began to view genetic material
as a means of developing treatment options for a variety of human
diseases.8 Today, approximately two-thirds of the new drugs that hit the
market have been influenced by genetic research,9 and genetic material has
for our prosperity, our security, and our health, and our way of life than it has ever been.”); see also
Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The future of
the nation depends in no small part on the efficiency of industry, and the efficiency of industry
depends in no small part on the protection of intellectual property.”).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective . . . Discoveries”). See generally Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110
(allowing federal protection for scientific inventions).
3. See George Washington, First Annual Address to Congress (Jan. 8, 1790), in 30 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745–1799, at
491, 491–92 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (stating that the general public’s “safety and interest
require[] that they should promote such manufactories[] as tend to render them independent on
others for essential, particularly military supplies”).
4. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989) (discussing
the purpose of the United States patent system).
5. See Gregory J. Higby, From Compounding to Caring: An Abridged History of American
Pharmacy, in PHARMACEUTICAL CARE 19, 36–37 (Calvin H. Knowlton & Richard P. Penna eds., 2d
ed. 2003) (discussing the increase of pharmaceutical inventions in the 1950s).
6. See LAURA B. SHRESTHA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32792, LIFE EXPECTANCY IN THE
UNITED STATES 2–5 (2006) (showing that the average American life expectancy has increased by
nearly thirty years in the past century and citing medical advances as a reason for these decreased
mortality rates); see also The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Kaiser Public Opinion Spotlight:
Views on Prescription Drugs and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 1 (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/spotlight/rxdrugs/upload/Rx_Drugs.pdf [hereinafter Kaiser] (indicating that
most American adults take prescription drugs and that a vast majority of Americans believe that
prescription drugs improve quality of life).
7. See DEP’T OF HEALTH STATISTICS & INFORMATICS IN THE INFO., WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE
GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE: 2004 UPDATE 8, 22 (2008), available at http://www.who.int/
healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GBD_report2004update_full.pdf (indicating that rates of
mortality due to noncommunicable diseases are expected to increase in the coming decades).
8. MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PATENT LAW 59 (3d ed. 2009).
9. See Andrew Pollack, The Genome at 10: Awaiting the Genome Payoff, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/business/15genome.html
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been linked to more than 850 human diseases.10 Additionally,
biotechnology investors have indicated—with their pocketbooks—that
they believe that the future of disease prevention and treatment is tied to
genetic research.11 Despite the fact that pharmaceutical companies have
invested billions of dollars for development of gene-related cures and
treatments for human illnesses,12 the general public and the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York wish to rein in the
intellectual property rights afforded to these companies.13 Furthermore, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.) is
divided in regard to DNA patentability14 and has indicated that any change
to DNA-patenting policy would be most effectively propagated
legislatively.15
In our society, there is a large disconnect between the supposed
interests of the public and the pharmaceutical industry. In general, the
public desires medical innovation but prefers to benefit from these medical
advances at minimal cost.16 Meanwhile, the pharmaceutical industry is
merely a business, and businesses are built on profit maximization.17
Because the pharmaceutical business is premised on seemingly altruistic
purposes, the industry is an easy target for individuals who cannot afford
its services.18 Due to the nature of the pharmaceutical industry, profit
(indicating that the Research and Development President at Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Research
Executive Vice President at Roche have both proclaimed that two-thirds of newly developed drugs
have been influenced by genetic research).
10. See Nicholas Wade, A Decade Later, Gene Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/health/research/13genome.html?
pagewanted=1&ref=business.
11. See Pollack, supra note 9 (stating that Merck recently purchased a small gene research
pharmaceutical company for $1.1 billion).
12. Id.
13. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that isolated human DNA is not patentable).
14. See infra Section I.B.
15. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), No.
2010-1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *66 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011) (stating that if DNArelated inventions are to be excluded from patentability, “the decision must come not from the
courts, but from Congress”); id. at *98 (Moore, J., concurring) (basing his opinion partly on the
“belief that we should defer to Congress, [he believes] . . . settled expectations tip the scale in favor
of [DNA] patentability”).
16. See Kaiser, supra note 6, at 1 (explaining that most Americans attribute improved quality
of life to advances in drug development, yet nearly half of surveyed Americans are displeased with
pharmaceutical companies because they are “too focused on profits”).
17. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number of States and the
Economics of American Federalism, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2011) (discussing businesses
manipulating output and pricing structures in order to maximize profit).
18. See Gina Kolata & Andrew Pollack, In Costly Cancer Drug, Hope and a Dilemma, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/06/health/06avastin.html
(reporting that “patient advocates are . . . troubled by very expensive treatments”); see also Malcolm
Gladwell, High Prices: How to Think About Prescription Drugs, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 2004,
at 86, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/10/25/041025crat_atlarge (discussing
the commonly held viewpoint that “drug companies are troubled and corrupt”).
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maximization benefits the general public. Therefore, decreasing
pharmaceutical company profits necessarily has the unintended side effect
of decreasing public health benefits.19 This complicated equilibrium has
been convoluted further by the district court ruling, and the subsequent
divided C.A.F.C. ruling, in the recent Myriad case.20
This Note will explore the seemingly contradictory interests of the
general public, the pharmaceutical industry, and the research community
regarding human gene patents. Part I will look at the recent Myriad
decisions in light of previous beliefs about the patentability of genetic
material. Part II will examine the effect of gene patenting on scientific
research and innovation. Parts III and IV will explore the effect of gene
patents on both the general public and the pharmaceutical industry, and
will seek to understand the belief dissonance between these two factions.
Part V will consider how Congress has handled similar problems in the
past through legislation, specifically in regards to plant patents and
biological drugs. Part VI will discuss the possibility of finding a solution to
the gene patent problem that satisfies the research community, the general
public, and the pharmaceutical industry. Ultimately, this Note will analyze
the success of prior legislation in order to propose a course of action that
will appease all parties involved in the human gene patenting debate.
I. THE MYRIAD CASE
Congress has statutorily provided that anyone who “invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent.”21 In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,22 the first Supreme Court
case involving patentability of genetic material, the Court ruled that
genetically engineered bacteria were patentable subject matter.23 The
Chakrabarty Court focused on the Congressional intent of 35 U.S.C. § 101
in trying to decide whether genetically engineered bacteria were included
within the statutory meaning of “‘manufacture’ or ‘composition of
matter.’”24 Because the patent law system was created with the idea that
“ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement,”25 the Court concluded
19. See Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals, 5 J.
INT’L ECON. L. 849, 849–50 (2002) (citing David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, Is Technological
Change in Medicine Worth It?, 20 HEALTH AFF. 11, 23 (2001)) (implying that technological
innovation is slowed by public backlash against the pharmaceutical industry).
20. Myriad II, No. 2010-1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011);
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 181.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
22. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
23. Id. at 318 (holding that Congress intended for 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be interpreted such that
genetically modified bacteria are patentable subject matter).
24. Id. at 307 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101).
25. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (quoting 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 75–76
(H.A. Washington ed., 1853)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Graham v. John Deere
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that patentable subject matter includes “anything under the sun that is made
by man.”26 Including genetically engineered bacteria within the definition
of “manufacture” or “composition of matter” was therefore deemed
consistent with the purpose of the patent law system.27 The Court
concluded by urging Congress to legislatively address the patentability of
genetic advances if the Court had misinterpreted the patentability statute.28
While Congress has failed to address the issue of human gene
patentability, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
directly addressed the issue in the 2001 version of its Utility Examination
Guidelines. Based on the updated guidelines, the mere discovery of a
genetic sequence is not sufficient to obtain a patent.29 However, if the gene
sequence has a defined utility, then genetic material that has been isolated
and purified is patentable, because it does not appear in nature in an
isolated and purified form.30 Even with this limitation in place, thousands
of patents relating to genetic material have been granted by the USPTO.31
When the validity of genetic material patents has been questioned, courts
have generally held that “pharmacological activity of any compound is
obviously beneficial to the public,”32 and therefore upheld patents on
functional genetic material.33 Prior to the Myriad rulings, it was generally
accepted by scholars that full-length genes were patentable subject matter
if the gene had a known function and use.34 It is within this context that the
Myriad case began making its way through the United States judicial
system.

Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1966) (describing Thomas Jefferson as the “first administrator of our patent
system” and discussing Jefferson’s philosophy on the purpose of patent law (quoting P.J. Federico,
Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. Pat. Off. Soc. 237, 238 (1936)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
26. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952) and H.R. REP.
NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court also noted that “laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas [are] not patentable.” Id.
27. Id. at 309–10.
28. Id. at 317–18.
29. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
30. Id.
31. Brief of Amicus Curiae Genetic Alliance in Opposition to Certain Positions of the
Plaintiffs at 9, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d
181 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
32. Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (finding that research tests
indicating the presence of pharmacological activity is evidence of an invention’s utility).
33. Compare In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (indicating that absence of
pharmacological activity reduces the likelihood that an invention has “utility”), with Ex parte Bhat,
No. 2008-003946, 2009 WL 1742172, at *4 (B.P.A.I. June 16, 2009) (holding that genetic material
with a known function satisfies the utility standard).
34. See, e.g., Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes
and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735,
766 (2000) (discussing the patentability of genetic material).
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A. Myriad I: United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York
The human genome contains between 20,000 and 25,000 functional35
genes.36 In the mid-1990s, researchers discovered a pair of genes, BRCA1
and BRCA2, that are responsible for proper maintenance of breast and
ovarian cells within the female human body.37 Mutations to these genes
result in a significantly increased likelihood that a woman will develop
breast or ovarian cancer.38 Armed with the knowledge of the presence of
these genetic mutations, a patient can develop a proactive approach to the
prevention and treatment of breast or ovarian cancer. Following
identification of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, Myriad Genetics, in
collaboration with the University of Utah Research Foundation, was able to
isolate these genes from the human body and develop a means of testing
patients for the presence of mutations to these genes.39 Myriad Genetics
subsequently obtained U.S. and foreign patent protection on the isolated
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes40 and diagnostic methods of testing for
mutations to these genes.41
In 2009, the Association for Molecular Pathology filed a complaint in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, asserting
that Myriad Genetics’ patents were unenforceable because isolated human
genes are unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.42 In
analyzing the patentability of the claims, the court divided the claims into
two subsets: “composition claims”43 and “method claims.”44 Under 35
U.S.C. § 101, a claimed invention is patentable if it “possesses utility” and
35. Generally, genes function by producing proteins that direct physiological activities in the
body. “Functional” genes are therefore defined as genes that ultimately lead to the production of
proteins.
36. Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Finishing the Euchromatic Sequence of
the Human Genome, 431 NATURE 931, 943 (2004).
37. See Yoshio Miki et al., A Strong Candidate for the Breast and Ovarian Cancer
Susceptibility Gene BRCA1, 266 SCI. 66 (1994) (discussing the identification of the BRCA1 gene
and linking the gene to breast and ovarian tissue); Richard Wooster et al., Identification of the
Breast Cancer Susceptibility Gene BRCA2, 378 NATURE 789 (1995) (discussing the identification
of the BRCA2 gene and linking the gene to breast tissue).
38. See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (indicating that women with mutations to both the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes face an 85% increase in the likelihood of developing breast cancer and a 50%
increase in the likelihood of developing ovarian cancer).
39. Id. at 184, 202–03.
40. See U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 (filed June 7, 1995) (patenting the isolated BRCA1 gene);
U.S. Patent No. 6,124,104 (filed Mar. 20, 1998) (patenting the isolated BRCA2 gene).
41. See U.S. Patent No. 5,709,999 (filed June 7, 1995) (patenting a method of testing for
mutations in the BRCA1 gene); U.S. Patent No. US 6,895,337 B1 (filed Oct. 15, 2002) (patenting a
method of testing for mutations in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes).
42. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 186.
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id. at 232.
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“constitutes statutory subject matter.”45 On all claims at issue, “it [was]
undisputed that [the inventions] possess[ed] utility.”46 Therefore, the sole
question facing the court was whether the claimed inventions were a
“product[] of nature,” and therefore excluded from patentability.47
Myriad Genetics’ composition claims were directed to isolated DNA
molecules coding for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 proteins. The Myriad I court
defined isolated DNA as “a segment of DNA nucleotides existing separate
from other cellular components normally associated with native DNA,”
and recognized that such isolated DNA is not typically found in nature.48
However, in analyzing the patentability of Myriad’s composition claims,
the court created a new test, a Markedly Different Test, to determine if the
claims fell within the products of nature exception to patentability.49
Despite recognizing that chemical bonds must be broken and reformed in
the creation of isolated DNA,50 the court ruled that Myriad’s composition
claims “merely constitute[] a difference in purity that cannot serve to
establish subject matter patentability.”51 Because the court viewed
Myriad’s composition claims as merely higher purity versions of native
DNA, the “isolated DNA [was] not markedly different from native DNA”
and was therefore “unpatentable subject matter.”52 In essence, Myriad’s
45. Id. at 220 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)).
46. Id.
47. Id. In general, courts have deemed inventions to be patentable unless they relate to a
“law[] of nature, physical phenomena, [or] abstract idea[].” Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the
Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775,
778 (2008) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
48. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 217.
49. Id. at 227–28 (stating that the composition claims are patentable if the isolated DNA has
“markedly different characteristics” from DNA found in nature (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50. Id. at 230 (stating that the claims at issue only involve BRCA1 and BRCA2 exon regions
of gene sequences). For a discussion of why chemical bonds must be broken and reformed in order
to isolate only exons, see id. at 197–98. Because chemical bonds are broken and reformed in the
process of isolating exons, the process is more aptly described as a chemical reaction, not a
chemical purification. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/reaction (last visited July 8, 2011) (defining “reaction” as “a process involving change in atomic
nuclei”).
51. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 229–30. The court implied that removing DNA from other
cellular components is “purification” because of the type of chemical bonds that exist between DNA
and cellular components. See id. at 195–96 & n.11 (stating that the “disassociation of histone
proteins from DNA by [a] high salt solution[] indicat[es] lack of covalent bond[s] between DNA
and histones”) (citing BRUCE ALBERTS ET AL., MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE CELL 208 fig. 4–24 (4th
ed. 2002))). Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that “covalent chemical bonds . . . hold DNA
itself together,” yet failed to acknowledge that isolating only a portion of native DNA necessarily
involves breaking chemical covalent bonds. Id. Because covalent chemical bonds are being broken,
the process of isolating DNA should be categorized as a “chemical reaction” rather than a chemical
purification. It is well-established in the scientific community that a chemical reaction results in the
formation of a different substance than the one present prior to the reaction.
52. Id. at 232. See supra notes 50–51 for a discussion of why isolated DNA is not merely a
purified version of native DNA.
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claims were nothing more than a “product of nature.” This holding was
contrary to prior case law indicating that naturally occurring chemicals, if
isolated and purified, represent patentable subject matter.53 The court
distinguished DNA from other chemical compounds, largely based on the
“biological realit[y]” that DNA has a more important function than other
chemical compounds.54
Myriad Genetics’ method claims were directed toward a process of
analyzing DNA sequence data to determine if a patient is predisposed to
breast or ovarian cancer.55 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit had previously created the “machine-or-transformation”
test, which states that “an application of a law of nature or mathematical
formula to a known structure or process”56 is patentable only if the process
“(1) . . . is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) . . . transforms a
particular article into a different state or thing.”57 The Myriad I court
applied the machine-or-transformation test to the claims at issue and held
the claims were unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
court held that, even if the claims “were construed to include [a] physical
transformation,”58 they would have been unpatentable nevertheless,
because the transformation was not “[t]he essence of what [was]
claimed.”59 Notably, following the Myriad I ruling, the Supreme Court
harshly criticized the exclusive application of the machine-ortransformation test to method claims60 and indicated that constraining
method claim patentability to only those claims that can pass the machineor-transformation test “violates [patent law] statutory interpretation
principles.”61
In holding that most of Myriad Genetics’ claims62 were invalid,63 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
departed from the commonly held view on the patentability of genetic

53. See Parke-Davis & Co. v. H. K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (finding
that isolated and purified adrenaline is patentable subject matter), rev’d in part, 196 F. 596 (2d Cir.
1912).
54. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 228.
55. Id. at 213–14.
56. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 953 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id. at 954.
58. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 236–37.
59. Id. at 236.
60. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226–27 (2010) (stating that “[t]he Court of Appeals
incorrectly concluded that this Court has endorsed the machine-or-transformation test as the
exclusive test” for determining whether a claimed method is patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
61. Id. at 3226. In light of the recent Supreme Court Bilski ruling, the Myriad I court erred in
adopting a strict application of the machine-or-transformation test to Myriad Genetics’ method
claims.
62. Judge Sweet ruled on the patentability of fifteeen claims spread across seven different
Myriad Genetics patents. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 211.
63. Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 238.
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material.64 Prior to the ruling, isolated genetic material with a known
function was deemed patentable subject matter.65 The Myriad I decision
was not only contrary to previous ideas regarding the patentability of
genetic material, but was viewed by some as being “contrary to 200 years
of natural products patenting.”66
B. Myriad II: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
On October 22, 2010, Myriad Genetics appealed the Myriad I ruling to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.67 On appeal, the
Department of Justice filed an amicus brief on behalf of the U.S.
government supporting a policy change regarding the patentability of
human genes.68 The government stated that, “contrary to the longstanding
practice of the [USPTO], . . . isolated genomic DNA . . . is not patenteligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”69 Despite acknowledging
that isolated DNA does not exist in nature,70 the government largely agreed
with the final holding in Myriad I. While the government disagreed with
the breadth of the court’s reasoning,71 it suggested that other patent law
statutes, such as 35 U.S.C. § 103, might be better served to invalidate
claims related to genetic material.72
On July 29, 2011, despite the U.S. government’s position on the
patentability of genetic material, the C.A.F.C. ruled that isolated DNA is
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.73 While the court
64. Prior to the court’s ruling, some viewed the lawsuit as frivolous in light of Supreme Court
precedent. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, ACLU Files Frivolous Lawsuit Challenging Patents,
IPWATCHDOG.COM (May 14, 2009), http://ipwatchdog.com/2009/05/14/aclu-files-frivolous-lawsuitchallenging-patents/id=3417.
65. See Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 29, at 1093 (stating that genetic material
does not appear in nature in the isolated or purified form and that it may be patentable if it has a
defined utility).
66. Remarks on Science Friday: Gene Patenting by Kevin Noonan (National Public Radio
broadcast Dec. 11, 2009), available at http://www.sciencefriday.com/program/archives/ 200912112
(discussing the pros and cons of gene patenting in general). For an example of a “natural products”
patent issued in 1873, see U.S. Patent No. 141072 (filed May 9, 1873).
67. Brief for Appellants, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
No. 2010-1406, 2010 WL 4600106 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 22, 2010).
68. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 2010-1406, 2010 WL 4853320 (Fed.
Cir. Oct. 29, 2010).
69. Id. at *18.
70. Id. at *21.
71. See id. at *9–10 (stating that cDNAs, vectors, recombinant plasmids, chimeric proteins,
vaccines, and genetically modified crops are patentable subject matter).
72. Id. at *17 (stating that claims to genetic material could be rejected for being obvious).
According to 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention is not patentable “if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.”
William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond to This Judicial
Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 237 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
73. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad II), No. 2010-

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 5 [2011], Art. 6

1286

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

determined that isolated DNA is patentable, a divided three-judge panel
released a “majority” opinion,74 a concurring opinion, and a dissenting
opinion. In the majority opinion, Judge Lourie, based on a well-reasoned
understanding of the underlying chemistry of isolated DNA, discussed at
length the structural distinctions between isolated and native DNA. Even
though isolated DNA may function similarly to native DNA, it is “a
distinct chemical entity” that does not exist in nature and therefore is
eligible for patent protection.75 Furthermore, because of the distinct
structural nature of isolated DNA, it should always be patentable under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
In contrast with the structural differences highlighted by Judge Lourie,
Judge Moore believes that the functional differences between isolated and
native DNA, in some circumstances, can enable isolated DNA to be patent
eligible.76 According to Judge Moore, the structural differences at issue
“do not . . . necessarily make[] isolated DNA [patentable].”77 Rather, the
important question is “whether these differences impart a new utility” to
the claimed DNA sequence.78 Judge Moore’s restrictive view of patentable
DNA, which is consistent with the USPTO view, imposes a significant
limitation upon the scope of patentable material as defined by the majority
opinion.
Lastly, Judge Bryson’s dissenting opinion largely aligns with the
opinion of the Department of Justice. Judge Bryson agrees with the holding
and reasoning of the District Court opinion, but limits the breadth of Judge
Sweet’s definition of unpatentable DNA.79 In essence, Judge Bryson
believes that isolated DNA is the same as “that which appear[s]
in . . . living human beings” and is therefore unpatentable.80
While each member of the three-judge panel disagrees about the
patentability, or reasoning therefore, of isolated DNA, all three judges
agree regarding the patentability of Myriad’s medical diagnostic claims.
The C.A.F.C. panel ruled that the majority of Myriad’s method claims
were directed to unpatentable subject matter.81 Despite the Supreme
Court’s Bilski decision,82 the C.A.F.C., like the District Court, applied the

1406, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *63 (Fed. Cir. July 29, 2011).
74. What the judges refer to as the “majority” opinion is actually the controlling opinion of a
single judge.
75. Myriad II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *57, *60, *63.
76. Id. at *92 (Moore, J., concurring).
77. Id. at *91.
78. Id. at *92.
79. Judge Bryson, like the other two judges on the panel, believes that cDNA is patentable
subject matter. Id. at *61 (Lourie, J., majority opinion), *75-76 (Moore, J., concurring), *117
(Bryson, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at *117–42.
81. Id. at *67–68 (Lourie, J., majority opinion)
82. See supra Section I.A.
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machine-or-transformation test to the claims at issue.83 In recent years, the
appropriate test used to assess the patentability of method claims has been
a source of contention between the C.A.F.C. and the Supreme Court. Prior
to the Supreme Court’s Bilski decision, the C.A.F.C, in Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services,84 applied the machineor-transformation test to medical diagnostic method claims similar to those
in the Myriad patents.85 In light of Bilksi v. Kappos, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the Prometheus case, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case back to the C.A.F.C.86 On remand, the Federal Circuit
reiterated its initial reasoning and reached the same result.87 In light of the
C.A.F.C.’s refusal to adopt the underlying principles articulated in Bilksi,
on June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court again granted a writ of certiorari in
Prometheus.88
Until the Supreme Court rules on Prometheus, the state of the law
concerning medical diagnostic claims, such as those in Myriad II, will
remain unclear. Based on the Supreme Court’s continued involvement with
Prometheus, it is unlikely that the machine-or-transformation test used in
Myriad II was the appropriate test for determining patentability of medical
diagnostic method claims. Regardless of the C.A.F.C.’s current opinion
regarding the unpatentability of Myriad’s method claims, until the Supreme
Court issues an opinion in Prometheus, the viability of Myriad’s method
claims as Myriad II moves forward will be unresolved.
In light of the recent stance taken by the United States government in
the Myriad II case and the divergent opinions of the three C.A.F.C. judges,
it is evident that the patent law system as it relates to human genes is in a
state of uncertainty. Based on the non-consensus of the C.A.F.C. in regard
to the scope of DNA patentability and the dynamic state of the law in
regard to medical diagnostic claims, it is likely that the Myriad II opinion
will be appealed.89 Even if Myriad II is appealed, the historical reluctance
of the courts and the USPTO to effectuate a change in gene patent policy90
83. Myriad II, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 15649, at *66 (Lourie, J., majority opinion) (“[W]e
conclude that all but one of Myriad’s method claims . . . fail the machine-or-transformation test.”)
84. 581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The claim at issue is directed to “determining the level of
6-thioguanine in said subject having said immune-mediated gastrointestinal disorder[.]” Id. at 1340.
85. Id. at 1342.
86. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010).
87. Id. at 1355 (“We do not think that either the Supreme Court’s GVR Order or the Court’s
Bilski decision dictates a wholly different analysis or a different result on remand.”).
88. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2010),
cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3710 (June 20, 2011) (No. 10-1150).
89. See Courtenay Brinckerhoff, Federal Circuit Issues Mixed Decision on Myriad Claims,
PHARMAPATENTS (June 30, 2011), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/federal-circuitdecisions/federal-circuit-decides-myriad-oks-isolated-dna-claims/ (“It is likely that . . . PlaintiffsAppellees will . . . petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.”).
90. See supra notes 21–34 and accompanying text (discussing the willingness of the USPTO
to grant patents related to genetic material, and the Supreme Court’s position that genetic material
patents are valid).
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means that any change to the current system can be most effectively
accomplished through legislation.91
The blanket ban on patentability of isolated human genes suggested by
the United States is a dangerous proposition. The history of patent law
teaches us that the inability to obtain market exclusivity disincentivizes
innovation.92 “The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents . . . is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of . . . inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”93 If
pharmaceutical companies cannot make a personal financial gain from
human genetic research, then the eventual result will be a decrease in
health benefits to the public. Ultimately, any successful gene patent
legislation will take into account the interest of all involved parties:
scientific researchers, the general public, and the pharmaceutical industry.
Myriad Genetics’ patents, and gene patents generally, have been a
source of controversy in the research community,94 among academic
scholars,95 and throughout the general public.96 Scientific researchers
worry that their research objectives will be constrained by the inability to
incorporate patented genes into their research projects.97 The result of
impairing scientific research is a decrease in the pace of scientific
innovation.98 Academic scholars argue that the disconnect between the
legislative branch of government, the judicial branch of government, and
the patent law system creates a field that lacks clarity and breeds
uncertainty.99 Because of this, many believe that the patent law system

91. Up to this point, one of the problems relating to genetic material is that the “dramatic
advances in genetics research have far outpaced lawmakers’ ability to address its social, ethical, and
legal implications.” Patricia Alten, GINA: A Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Solution in
Search of a Problem, 61 FLA. L. REV. 379, 381 (2009).
92. See infra Part V.
93. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
94. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (arguing that gene patents
simultaneously spur innovation and inhibit scientific research).
95. See James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome: What Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could
Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 105–06 (F. Scott
Kieff ed., 2003) (discussing the pros and cons of patenting genes); E. Richard Gold & Julia
Carbone, Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm, 12 GENETICS MED. S39, S44–48 (2010)
(discussing the impact of the BRCA1and BRCA2 patents on scientific research and the general
public).
96. See BRCA: Genes and Patents, ACLU (May 27, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/freespeech/brca-genes-and-patents#09 (arguing that the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene patents undermine
“bodily integrity[] and women’s health”).
97. See Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision of Clinical
Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS 3, 8 (2003) (reporting that scientific
researchers feel that gene patents increase the costs of research).
98. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 699.
99. Holman & Munzer, supra note 34, at 765 (“[T]here is no straightforward legal reason to
deny patent protection to all ESTs.”)
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should be altered either legislatively,100 judicially,101 or departmentally.102
The general public is concerned that Myriad Genetics’ monopoly over the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes will result in decreased quality of testing
procedures103 and an inability to obtain testing due to prohibitively high
costs to the patient.104 Parts II through III explore these concerns in more
detail.
II. THE EFFECT OF GENE PATENTING ON SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
The effect of gene patenting on scientific research is a hotly debated
issue. Gene patenting opponents believe that patenting human genes
inhibits scientific research, which is ultimately detrimental to society.
Conversely, gene patenting proponents believe that patenting human genes
stimulates scientific research, leading to a multitude of societal benefits.
The remainder of this Part explores the arguments put forth by both sides
in the gene patenting debate relating to the affect of gene patenting on
scientific research.
A. Opponents of Gene Patenting
The main argument put forth by researchers who oppose the idea of
human gene patenting is that gene patenting inhibits scientific research.
This problem relates primarily to what has been termed the “tragedy of the
anticommons.”105 It is widely accepted among the scientific community
that genes rarely function independently, but rather work in concert with
other genes.106 Because there are a multitude of functional genes in the
human body, it is possible that a single strand of DNA could be “owned”
by several thousand different researchers. In this situation, a researcher
would be unable to engage in basic genetic research without first obtaining

100. See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY: GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND
THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS 4–6 (2010) [hereinafter SACGHS]
(recommending to Congress six different ways to alleviate the gene patent problem).
101. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 5 (2009) (arguing that the courts are best equipped for handling pharmaceutical patentrelated problems).
102. See Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Revisiting the USPTO’s Examination Guidelines for Gene
Patents: Congressional Inaction, USPTO Restraint, and Judicial Remedy, 6 J. INT’L
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. 204, 207, 209 (2009) (arguing that the USPTO should consider policy
implications prior to the granting of a patent).
103. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
104. Id. at 203–04 (stating that some insurance providers do not cover BRCA1 and BRCA2
testing procedures and that costs to an uninsured patient surpass $3000 per test).
105. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 698.
106. See Denise Caruso, A Challenge to Gene Theory, a Tougher Look at Biotech, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2007, at 33, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/business/yourmoney/01frame.
html?pagewanted=1&_r=2 (discussing the complexities of the human genome).
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a license from each of the separate “owners” of that strand.107 For
researchers engaging in such study, accumulating the licenses to work with
multiple genes could prove prohibitively costly, both in terms of time and
money.108 Ultimately, this will lead researchers to engage in a less
inventive course of study with fewer obstacles.
Choosing courses of research based on patent avoidance has several
adverse effects. First, opting not to engage in cutting-edge research hinders
scientific innovation.109 If fewer scientists are trying to cure a disease, then
fewer novel discoveries relating to that disease will be made. Additionally,
some believe that gene patents prevent the improvement of already existing
medical tests.110 Because gene patents inhibit competition for a period of
time, the monopoly owner has no incentive to improve already existing
tests.111 It has also been argued that gene patents negatively impact “the
culture of science.”112 Forcing scientists to continuously navigate the patent
landscape is unproductive and negatively “alter[s] the way in which
researchers study and work with gene sequences.”113
B. Proponents of Gene Patenting
On the contrary, proponents of human gene patenting argue that it does
not inhibit innovation,114 but rather, stimulates novel discoveries.115
107. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 94, at 699.
108. Id.
109. See Isabelle Huys et al., Legal Uncertainty in the Area of Genetic Diagnostic Testing, 27
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 903, 903 (2009) (mentioning that gene patent opponents believe that
“patent thickets” on genetic material will hinder scientific innovation).
110. See Michael Crichton, Op-Ed, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html?_r=1&n=Top%2fReference%2fTime
s%20Topics%2fPeople%2fC%2fCrichton%2c%20Michael&oref=slogin (arguing that inventors
should not be able to obtain patents on genetic material).
111. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Myriad I), 702 F.
Supp. 2d 181, 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (arguing that Myriad’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 patents have
“hindered the ability of patients to receive the highest-quality breast cancer genetic testing and
[have] impeded the development of improvements to BRCA1/2 genetic testing”).
112. Donald Zuhn, Gene Patenting Debate Continues, PATENT DOCS (June 9, 2009, 11:59
PM), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/06/gene-patenting-debate-continues.html (quoting the
statement of Shobita Parthasarathy, Co-Director of the Science, Technology, and Public Policy
Program at the Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (discussing the effects of gene patenting on genetic research).
113. Id.
114. See Christopher M. Holman, Trends in Human Gene Patent Litigation, 322 SCI. 198, 198
(2008) (“[A]ny chilling effect [as a result of gene patents] arises primarily from a perception of risk
that may not comport with reality.”); Donald Zuhn, Gene Patenting Debate Continues—Round
Two, PATENT DOCS (Aug. 4, 2009, 6:35 AM), http://www.patentdocs.org/ 2009/08/by-donald-zuhn--gene-patenting-its-a-topic-that-public-radio-just-cant-seem-to-get-enough-of-this-summer-in-junedr-han.html (“The view that patent law somehow inhibits research is not well founded by attempts
to look at [the] question in a non-anecdotal way.”).
115. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (arguing that gene patents stimulate
biotechnological breakthroughs); Jim Greenwood, Patents Promote Innovation, USA TODAY, June
16, 2009, at 8A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20090616/
editorial16_st1.art.htm (arguing that a prohibition of gene patents would freeze biomedical
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Because gene therapies hold the promise of finding cures for many
problematic diseases, biotechnology companies are investing heavily in
genetic research.116 This investment has ultimately led to scientific
innovation that has “improved medical treatments, reduced suffering, and
saved the lives of millions of Americans.”117 Furthermore, gene patent
proponents argue that gene patenting does not adversely affect scientific
research. Regarding the issue of gene patent inhibition of scientific
advancement, research indicates that academic scientists are rarely affected
by gene patents.118 Patenting genetic information places it in the public
domain, thereby providing researchers with information from which they
can make future discoveries.119 As evidence that gene patents do not inhibit
scientific research, supporters point to the fact that over 8,000 research
articles have been published relating to the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes
associated with Myriad Genetics’ patents.120 It is difficult to argue that the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene patents have inhibited scientific research relating
to these genes when over 8,000 studies of the genes have been performed
and published by academic researchers.
III. HOW GENE PATENTS AFFECT THE GENERAL PUBLIC
One of the primary concerns of the general public, relating to human
gene patents, is the notion that patents are inhibiting citizens from
obtaining adequate medical treatment.121 Myriad Genetics’ BRCA1 and
BRCA2 patents give the company a monopoly over the ability to test for
mutations to these genes. Because of this, “one lab dictates the standards
innovation).
116. See Joseph Fuller & Brock Reeve, Editorial, Will We Lose in the Stem Cell Race?, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2007, at A15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/02/AR2007020201525.html (discussing the billions of dollars that are
invested in the biotechnology industry).
117. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION 3 (2009) (discussing how the lure of patent protection incentivizes biotechnological
innovation).
118. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GENETIC INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES 79 (2002) (finding that the number of gene patents
that pose problems to scientific researchers is substantially smaller than the total number of gene
patents that have been awarded); JOHN P. WALSH, CHARLENE CHO & WESLEY M. COHEN, PATENTS,
MATERIAL TRANSFERS AND ACCESS TO RESEARCH INPUTS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH: FINAL REPORT
TO THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES’ COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
GENOMIC AND PROTEIN-RELATED INVENTIONS 37 (2005) (indicating that only 1% of academic
researchers are adversely affected by patents); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen,
Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021, 1021 (2003) (finding that a more complex
patent landscape has not precluded research scientists from pursuing worthwhile research projects).
119. See F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the
Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691, 701 (2001) (stating
that the patent process allows researchers to have access to information that would otherwise remain
a secret).
120. See Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 210.
121. Id.
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for patient care in testing for [breast and ovarian cancer.]”122 The lack of
competition created by the patents may allow Myriad Genetics to conduct
lower quality tests and deemphasize the importance of testing accuracy and
efficiency.123 Furthermore, this monopoly creates a situation in which some
patients are unable to obtain the genetic testing offered by Myriad
Genetics. If a patient’s health insurance does not cover the testing, then the
patient must pay over $3,000 to have Myriad Genetics perform the test.124
For many people, this price tag is prohibitively high.125 By comparison,
BRCA1and BRCA2 testing is substantially more affordable in countries that
refuse to recognize Myriad Genetics’ patents.126 Additionally, countries
that facilitate competition in BRCA1and BRCA2 testing have been able to
produce a test that is not only cheaper, but also more accurate.127
The general public is also concerned about the ethical dilemma caused
by human gene patenting.128 Gene patenting opponents claim that
pharmaceutical companies are “patenting life” and that “[you], or someone
you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never have been
granted in the first place.”129 Opponents argue that corporations now
“own” more than twenty percent of all human genes,130 and that these
genes, though located within every human body, are now the private
property of patent owners.131 Because of private gene ownership, every
time two individuals procreate, they are reproducing privately owned genes
and therefore infringing upon the “invention” of another.132 The ability to
patent genes affords owners the ability to “influence what technologies
cost, whose cultural and ethical values they represent, and what aspects of
the research and development process will be transparent—and to
whom.”133
Gene patent proponents argue that the general public’s opinion of gene
122. Id.
123. Id. at 206, 210.
124. Id. at 203.
125. Id. at 204.
126. Ontario to Offer New Genetic Test for Breast, Ovarian Cancer, CBC NEWS (Jan. 8,
2003), http://www.cbc.ca/health/story/2003/01/06/test_genetic030106.html (stating that the cost of
genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer in Canada is approximately one-third of the cost of
testing in the United States).
127. Id. (stating that Canadian companies have created a genetic test for breast and ovarian
cancer that is 10% more accurate than Myriad Genetics’ test).
128. See Kathryn Garforth, Life as Chemistry or Life as Biology? An Ethic of Patents on
Genetically Modified Organisms, in PATENTING LIVES: LIFE PATENTS, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT
27, 52 (Johanna Gibson ed., 2008) (arguing that a human gene patent is “unethical because it denies
the true nature of life and life forms, namely their autonomy, uniqueness and sanctity”).
129. Crichton, supra note 110 (arguing that gene patents should be prohibited).
130. Denise Caruso, Someone (Other than You) May Own Your Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2007, at 3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/28/business/yourmoney/28reframe. html.
131. Crichton, supra note 110.
132. See DAVID KOEPSELL, WHO OWNS YOU?: THE CORPORATE GOLD-RUSH TO PATENT YOUR
GENES 156 (2009) (arguing that gene patents should be prohibited).
133. Caruso, supra note 130.
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patenting has been swayed by emotional, anecdotal, and inaccurate pleas
made by gene patent opponents.134 In fact, entire articles have been written
in an effort to dispel the “[f]alsehoods, [d]istortions and [o]utright [l]ies”
promulgated by gene patent opponents.135 The sensationalization of
incorrect information—that human beings are now owned by
pharmaceutical companies—has led the public to erroneously believe that
pharmaceutical companies are “going to knock on [their] door . . . and give
[them] a bill for using [the patent owner’s] gene.”136 By accepting the
emotional appeal of the opponents, the general public has come to desire a
result that will ultimately be detrimental to American society.
IV. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES AND GENE PATENTING
Because pharmaceutical companies are business ventures, they are
primarily concerned with maximizing profits.137 These companies invest
more than $50 billion annually in research and development efforts.138 For
many biotechnology companies, patents are the only means of convincing
investors to fund lifesaving genetic research. Private investment in
biotechnology is necessary because of the costly nature, both in terms of
time and money, of bringing a pharmaceutical product to market.139 It is
estimated that the process of research, development, and marketing of a
drug takes an average of nearly ten years140 and between $500 million and
134. Gene Quinn, Emotion and Anecdotes Should Not Drive Patent Policy Debate,
IPWATCHDOG.COM (June 16, 2010), http://ipwatchdog.com/2010/06/16/emotion-and-anecdotesshould-not-drive-patent-policy-debate/id=11260 (stating that gene patent opponents use emotional
appeal to sway the general public).
135. See Kevin E. Noonan, Falsehoods, Distortions and Outright Lies in the Gene Patenting
Debate, PATENT DOCS (June 15, 2009), http://www.patentdocs.org/2009/06/falsehoods-distortionsand-outright-lies-in-the-gene-patenting-debate.html (arguing that gene patent opponents’
propaganda “inhibits reasoned discussion, and . . . suggests . . . that gene patenting is just wrong
somehow”).
136. See Noonan, supra note 66, at 00:21:35.
137. See Marlene Cimons & Paul Jacobs, Biotech Battlefield: Profits vs. Public, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 21, 1999, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/1999/feb/21/news/mn-10290 (stating
that pharmaceutical companies’ first responsibility is to satisfy their shareholders as opposed to
satisfying the public). But see Lisa M. Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory
for Actualizing Social Responsibility Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 774 (2007) (discussing the
possibility of large corporations’ profit maximization being second in importance to their
commitment to nonshareholders).
138. Stifling or Stimulating—The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 4 (2007).
139. Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, President, Biotechnology Indus. Org., to Howard Coble,
Chairman, House Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. (Mar. 21,
2002), available at http://bio.org/ip/action/Coble.pdf (discussing the importance of patents to the
pharmaceutical industry).
140. See Henry Grabowski, Follow-on Biologics: Data Exclusivity and the Balance Between
Innovation and Competition, 7 NATURE REVIEWS DRUG DISCOVERY 479, 482 & fig.2 (2008)
(discussing the time and financial costs of getting both chemical and biological therapies to the
marketplace).
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$2 billion to complete.141 Furthermore, because of the difficulty of
assessing which research projects will be successful, less than one percent
of biotechnology research ventures ever make it to the marketplace.142 This
low success rate means that the average biotechnology company will not be
profitable until their successful products have been on the market for over
twelve years.143 Indeed, only about five percent of biotechnology
companies are even profitable at all.144 Because of the high risk and reward
associated with investing in pharmaceutical companies, the industry would
not be sustainable without the promise of patent protection for
biotechnological discoveries.145 Furthermore, disallowing patent protection
would promote “free-riding” by competitors, which would likely further
increase the costs of research and development relative to the profit
gained.146
To the extent that pharmaceutical companies would continue to develop
novel therapeutics in the absence of patent protection, these companies
would likely maintain their profit levels through acquisition of trade
secrets.147 Withholding scientific information from the public domain
would detrimentally affect both the pace of scientific innovation and public
well-being. When drug companies have opted to maintain genetic research
secrecy as opposed to applying for patents in the past, these situations have
been met with public outrage.148 Academic researchers have accused these
companies of costing taxpayers millions of dollars and “critically stalling
the pace of scientific progress.”149 Critics charged that previous decisions
to keep genetic research advancement a secret “slowed research by four or
five years.”150 If all pharmaceutical companies protected their investments
through trade secrets, the pace of innovation would slow, resulting in
141. See Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating the Cost of New Drug
Development: Is it Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFF. 420, 427 (2006) (discussing the financial
costs of getting a new drug to the marketplace).
142. See Grabowski, supra note 19, at 851.
143. See id. at 486 & fig.6.
144. Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, supra note 120.
145. See Grabowski, supra note 19, at 851–52 (stating that patent protection is essential for
continued investment in the pharmaceutical industry).
146. See generally Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373 (2010)
(discussing the “free-riding” problem as it relates to copyrights).
147. See SACGHS, supra note 100, at 26 (explaining that if patents were not available,
inventors would seek trade secrets to protect their inventions). For a discussion of the pros and cons
of trade secrets, see generally David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our
Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135 (2007).
148. From 1996 to 1998, a life-threatening strain of Staphylococcus aureus killed several
people around the world, and public health officials became concerned about the possibility of an
epidemic. Multiple private biotechnology companies had previously spent large amounts of time
and money to decode the genome for this deadly bacterium, but those companies refused to freely
share this information with government officials or other scientific researchers. See Cimons &
Jacobs, supra note 137.
149. Id.
150. Id. (quoting the statement of Dr. Olaf Schneewind) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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increased public expense, in terms of both financial costs and personal
well-being.
In general, the U.S. economy has come to rely heavily on scientific
innovation.151 Commercialized invention is good for the “long term growth
and economy” of a country.152 Publicly traded biotechnology companies
are estimated to be worth around $360 billion,153 a significant portion of
which is infused into the American economy each year.154 Additionally, the
biotechnology industry is responsible for the creation of over seven million
U.S. jobs.155 Thus, the American economy, quality of life,156 and national
security157 all depend heavily on the success of the biotechnology industry.
V. LEARNING FROM HISTORY: WHAT PLANTS AND DRUGS CAN TEACH
US ABOUT GENES
A shift in human gene patenting policy seems inevitable.158 Because of
the importance of the pharmaceutical industry to the American economy,
health, and way of life, any legislation curtailing the intellectual property
rights of the industry should simultaneously promote industrial innovation.
In determining the likely real-world effects of legislation on the
pharmaceutical industry, it is helpful to look at the effects of previous
legislation on both innovation and public benefit.
A. The History of Agricultural Innovation
The current controversy regarding the patentability of human genes is
not the first time that gene patentability has been the subject of national
debate.159 The plant patentability debate preceded the human gene
151. See Lee Bendekgey & Diana Hamlet-Cox, Gene Patents and Innovation, 77 ACAD. MED.
1373, 1375 (2002).
152. Dianne Nicol & Jane Nielsen, Patents and Medical Biotechnology: An Empirical
Analysis of Issues Facing the Australian Industry 85 (Ctr. for Law and Genetics Occasional Paper
No. 6, 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.lawgenecentre.org/
Publication%20PDF/OccPap%206%20contents.pdf; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974) (recognizing that patent law has “a positive effect on society through the
introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations
by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens”).
153. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY 2008 at 2 (Roxanna GuilfordBlake & Debbie Strickland eds., 2008), available at http://bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/BiotechGuide
2008.pdf.
154. Id. at 72.
155. K. John Morrow, Jr., Is Building Biotech an Economic Magic Potion?, 20 BIOPHARM.
INT’L 82, 82 (2007).
156. See TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AM. INNOVATION, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: IS THE
UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETITIVE EDGE? 1–2 (2005) (discussing the fact that European and
Asian countries are competing with the United States to be world leaders in scientific innovation).
157. Id. at 2 (discussing the relationship between American innovation and America’s status as
a world power).
158. See supra Part I.
159. See Jim Chen, The Parable of the Seeds: Interpreting the Plant Variety Protection Act in
Furtherance of Innovation Policy, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 108 (2005) (“[D]isputes over the
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patentability debate by almost eighty years.160 Because of the similarities
between plant patents and human gene patents, it is informative to analyze
the effects of governmental involvement in plant patentability.
Beginning in the late 1800s,161 the difficulty involved in obtaining
patent protection for new varieties of plants “derail[ed] innovation in this
field.”162 A major source of this difficulty was the inability of inventors to
satisfy the written description requirement for utility patents under 35
U.S.C. § 112.163 In order to more effectively benefit the public through
production of a stable food supply, Congress enacted the Townsend–
Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA).164 The PPA effectively abolished
the written description requirement for asexually reproduced plants,
requiring instead that inventors deposit a plant specimen at the USPTO.165
By providing inventors with patent rights, Congress financially
incentivized the invention of novel plant breeds. As intended, the promise
of plant patent protection resulted in an increase in scientific research
related to asexually reproduced plant varieties.166
While the PPA spurred scientific research on asexually reproduced
plants, it did nothing to incentivize research on sexually reproduced plant
varieties.167 Because the seed and agriculture industries depend mostly on
sexually reproduced plants, the PPA did not effectively promote
development in these fields.168 In order to stimulate the development of
novel, sexually reproduced plant varieties, Congress enacted the Plant
ownership of plant genetic material have yielded some of the most emotionally explosive battles
over intellectual property . . . .”).
160. For a discussion of the plant patentability debate, see Nicholas J. Seay, Protecting the
Seeds of Innovation: Patenting Plants, 16 AIPLA Q. J. 418 (1989).
161. See id. at 419–20.
162. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property Protection for
Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for Agriculture, 27
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 91 (1995) (discussing the difficulties associated with obtaining a plant
patent prior to Congress’ passage of the Townsend–Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930).
163. In order to obtain a patent, the inventor must satisfy a written description requirement. 35
U.S.C. § 112 (2006). In the patent application, the inventor must adequately describe his invention.
The purpose of the written description requirement is to ensure that the inventor has actually
invented and is in possession of what is claimed in the patent application. See Alison E. Cantor,
Using the Written Description and Enablement Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 267, 296–97 (2000); Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of Trademark
Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243, 335 (2004) (stating that “a patent’s claims must
be interpreted in light of the patent’s written description of the invention”); see also Elisa Rives,
Comment, Mother Nature and the Courts: Are Sexually Reproducing Plants and Their Progeny
Patentable Under the Utility Patent Act of 1952?, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 187, 198 (2001) (discussing
the difficulties that inventors faced when attempting to patent novel plant varieties).
164. Pub. L. No. 71-245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161–64
(2006)).
165. See Rives, supra note 163, at 197–99.
166. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 143, at 93 (discussing the increase in plant patents
issued in the decades following the enactment of the PPA).
167. See Rives, supra note 163, at 199.
168. Id. at 199–200.
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Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA).169 Based on the PVPA, the United
States Secretary of Agriculture may issue a certificate to a plant breeder
who creates a novel, sexually reproduced plant.170 Similar to the PPA, the
PVPA allows patent-like protection to an inventor who deposits a seed
specimen at the Department of Agriculture.171 Congress included two
exemptions to the PVPA certificate holder’s property rights in order to
balance the interests of the consumer and the seed industry: the Farmers’
Privilege and the Research Exemption.172
The Farmers’ Privilege,173 which allowed farmers to save and sell seeds
from their crops, was a point of contention between farmers and seed
growers. The Privilege allowed farmers to maximize profits at the expense
of the seed companies’ intellectual property interests. In 1994, under
pressure from the seed industry, Congress amended the PVPA to
significantly narrow the Farmer’s Privilege such that farmers are now only
able to save seeds for replanting, rather than sell them.174
According to the Research Exemption, “[t]he use and reproduction of a
protected variety for plant breeding or other bona fide research shall not
constitute an infringement of the protection provided under [the
PVPA].”175 The Research Exemption allows researchers to perform studies
on PVPA-certified seeds, thereby promoting the advancement of
agricultural biotechnology. This Exemption does not allow researchers to
profit from “hybrid or different variet[ies]” of the certified seed, but allows
them to use certified seeds as a “stepping stone[] to develop new
varieties.”176
As intended, the passage of the PVPA promoted innovation in sexually
reproduced agriculture. Protection of seed companies’ intellectual property
rights enabled the companies to financially benefit from the creation of
new plant varieties, which led to increased investment in the field.177
Within ten years of the enactment of the PVPA, “three times as many
wheat and soybean and six times as many cotton varieties were developed
than in the decade prior to the Act’s passage.”178
As previously discussed, one of the driving forces behind Congress’
passage of plant patent or certificate legislation was the inability of plant
169. See 7 U.S.C. § 2581 (2006).
170. See id. § 2483.
171. See id. § 2422(2).
172. See Rives, supra note 163, at 201–04 (discussing both exemptions).
173. 7 U.S.C. § 2543.
174. Rives, supra note 163, at 201–03.
175. Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal Appropriability in
Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1409 (1996) (quoting 7 U.S.C.
§ 2544).
176. See Rives, supra note 163, at 204.
177. See Edmund J. Sease & Robert A. Hodgson, Plants are Properly Patentable Under
Prevailing U.S. Law and This is Good Public Policy, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 327, 330 (2006)
(discussing the effect of the PPA and the PVPA on “new plant innovations and varieties”).
178. Id.
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breeders to satisfy the written description requirement necessary to obtain a
utility patent. As genetic engineering and identification techniques
advanced, researchers became more able to adequately describe various
plant breeds based on the plants’ genetic sequences.179 This development,
combined with the judicial attitude regarding the patentability of genetic
material,180 allowed plant breeders to adequately satisfy the written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and obtain plant utility patents.
Recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the idea that genetically modified
plants are intellectual property, protectable via utility patents.181 The ability
of breeders to acquire a wider scope of protection through utility patents
has “stimulated investment in the development and marketing of
commercial [seed] varieties, such as genetically modified corn, soybeans,
and cotton . . . .”182 In the last several decades, plant biotechnology
innovation has advanced at a faster pace than the rate of advancement of all
other technologies combined.183
In many respects, the plant patenting debate mirrors the human gene
patenting debate. Agricultural innovation can increase crop yields,
maximize food nutritional value, preserve the environment, and stabilize
farmers’ outputs. Additionally, agricultural biotechnology can solve many
global issues, such as food shortages and decreased biodiversity.184
Nonetheless, scholars and researchers are concerned that the “tragedy of
the anticommons” is affecting the agriculture industry.185 Because utility
patents do not contain a research exemption, scientists are concerned that
the growing number of plant-related utility patents will inhibit their
research.186 Furthermore, an increase in plant patent protection has resulted
179. See Debra L. Blair, Intellectual Property Protection and Its Impact on the U.S. Seed
Industry, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 315 (1999) (discussing the impact that advances in genetic
engineering had on the ability of plant breeders to obtain plant utility patents).
180. See generally Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (holding that genetically
modified bacteria are patentable); Ex parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (B.P.A.I. 1985)
(holding that plants are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101).
181. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 144 (2001)
(holding that “[t]he plain meaning of § 101, as interpreted by this Court in Chakrabarty, clearly
includes plants within its subject matter”).
182. Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African
Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 346 (2004) (discussing the
impact of plant utility patents on agricultural innovation).
183. Since 1981, the number of patents issued to plant biotechnology per year has increased
almost nine-fold. In the same timeframe, “overall utility patents per year slightly more than
doubled.” Id. at 347.
184. See Mary Lynne Kupchella, Note, Agricultural Biotechnology: Why It Can Save the
Environment and Developing Nations, but May Never Get a Chance, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 721, 721 (2001) (citing Gordon Conway, Biotech Can Feed the World, or Divide It,
PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 19, 1999, at 9B).
185. See Taylor & Cayford, supra note 182, at 349–50 (discussing how “patent thickets”
inhibit innovation).
186. Id. (noting that the largest research barriers “are simple refusals by [patent] owners to
license [the patented technology]”); see also Elizabeth A. Rowe, Patents, Genetically Modified
Foods, and IP Overreaching, 64 SMU L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing the propensity of
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in a decrease in farmers’ planting rights.187 Farmers are outraged by the
fact that patent laws prevent them from “saving seed,”188 the high prices
they are forced to pay to obtain seeds of superior plant varieties,189 and the
ways in which genetic engineering has altered the farming culture.190
The last century of agricultural development teaches several lessons
that can be applied to the human gene patenting debate: increased
intellectual property protection results in increased innovation;191
innovation can be manipulated by legislation;192 and the process of finding
a legislative balance that appeases both consumers and industries can be
lengthy. Interestingly, the plant patent debate began in a time when
breeders were afforded zero protection for their inventions, and legislation
was used to promote innovation and protection of breeders’ intellectual
property. The opposite is true in the human gene patenting debate: the
starting point is one in which intellectual property is afforded maximum
protection, and the general public wishes to rein in this protection.
B. The Hatch–Waxman Act: Legislation Regulating Pharmaceutical
Drugs
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress had seemingly
contradictory concerns: that the patent law system inadequately promoted
pharmaceutical innovation and that the price of pharmaceuticals was
skyrocketing.193 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938

seed licenses to prohibit crop research).
187. See Kelly T. Crosby, The United States and Iraq: Plant Patent Protection and Saving
Seed, 9 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 511, 511 (2010) (discussing the fact that patent law favors
large businesses).
188. Id. (quoting Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around
Statutory Protection of Intellectual Property, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 93, 96 n.10 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Adam Liptak, Saving Seeds Subjects Farmers to Suits over
Patent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/us/saving-seeds-subjectsfarmers-to-suits-over-patent.html?scp=45&sq=monsanto+%26+farmer&st=nyt (discussing patent
infringement suits between farmers and seed companies).
189. See William Neuman, Rapid Rise in Seed Prices Draws U.S. Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/business/12seed.html?pagewanted=1&sq=monsanto
%20&st=nyt&%20farmer&scp=19 (discussing the effect of seed company monopolies on seed
prices).
190. See Verlyn Klinkenborg, Editorial Observer: Biotechnology and the Future of
Agriculture, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1997, at A24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/08/
opinion/editorial-observer-biotechnology-and-the-future-of-agriculture.html?scp=48&sq=monsanto
+%26+farmer&st=nyt (arguing that farmers, not biotechnology companies, should be responsible
for improving crops).
191. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 162, at 93; Sease & Hodgson, supra note 177, at 330.
192. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Plant Variety Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583
(2006).
193. Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch–Waxman Act: History,
Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590 (2003); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 187, 188 (1999) (providing an overview of the Hatch–Waxman Act’s legislative genesis).
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(FDCA)194 created the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and gave it
the authority to ensure the safety of any “new drug” before the drug was
used in commerce.195 In 1962, the FDCA was amended196 to require a drug
manufacturer to illustrate the effectiveness of its drug prior to FDA
approval.197 This new “effectiveness requirement” required a manufacturer
to submit “substantial evidence” of the drug’s effectiveness through
administration of the drug in multiple clinical studies.198 Because
manufacturers typically obtained patents as early in the research process as
possible, the “effectiveness requirement” drastically shortened the period
of time that the innovator could benefit from patent exclusivity.199 In
effect, “the 1962 Amendments . . . increase[d] the research costs of
innovator firms and . . . reduce[d] the time they stood to benefit from the
investment.”200 This increased cost was ultimately passed on to the
consumer, resulting in price increases for many prescription drugs.201
By the early 1980s, the nation struggled to find its place in the trilemma
created by consumer health,202 consumer budget,203 and promotion of
prescription drug innovation.204 With the goal of reconciling these
competing interests, Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch–Waxman Act).205 In order to
incentivize innovation, the Hatch–Waxman Act allows drug manufacturers
to recoup patent term exclusivity for a period of time “equal to the
‘regulatory review period for the approved product.’”206 The Hatch–
Waxman Act also provides inventors with additional periods of market
exclusivity for certain types of drug innovations.207 Simultaneously, the
194. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)).
195. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 587.
196. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)).
197. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 587–88.
198. Id. (quoting § 102(c), 76 Stat. at 781) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. Following the 1962 Amendments, “the FDA require[d] 10 to 15 years of preapproval
[research and development] after a patent application [was] filed.” Sherry M. Knowles, Fixing the
Legal Framework for Pharmaceutical Research, 327 SCI. 1083, 1083 (2010).
200. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 588.
201. Id. at 590.
202. The “effectiveness requirement” ensured that every commercial pharmaceutical drug
benefited the health of the consumer. Id. at 588.
203. Consumer budget relates to the escalating costs of prescription medications. Id. at 590.
204. For a discussion of how to balance these competing interests, see James Thuo Gathii,
Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy Consistently with Facilitating
Access to Affordable Aids Drugs to Low-End Consumers, 53 FLA. L. REV. 727 (2001).
205. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
206. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 590–91 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2000))
(explaining that the Hatch-Waxman Act allows manufacturers to extend patent exclusivity to a
maximum of five years).
207. Id. at 591–93 (discussing extended periods of market exclusivity that are provided for
discovery of new chemical entities and new clinical investigations).
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Act promotes consumers’ interests by increasing their access to generic
pharmaceutical drugs.208 If a generic drug is the “same” or “bioequivalent”
to an FDA-approved brand name drug, then the generic drug manufacturer
will be allowed to undergo expedited FDA approval.209 Under expedited
approval, the generic manufacturer is not required to go through clinical
testing for the product.210 Furthermore, the Hatch–Waxman Act provides a
research exemption for generic manufacturers, allowing them to
“experiment with patented brand-name drugs in order to establish the
bioequivalency of generic drug substitutes and thereby obtain FDA
approval of the generic drugs prior to the expiration of the brand-name
patents.”211 This exemption allows generic drugs to hit the marketplace the
day after the brand-name drug patent expires.212 Patients therefore have
access to generic-drug prices earlier than they would have previously.
Because of this, “the Hatch-Waxman Act effectively establish[ed] a robust
generic drug industry in the United States.”213
By adequately balancing the competing concerns of the consumer, the
generic drug manufacturer, and the pharmaceutical company, the Hatch–
Waxman Act214 has successfully achieved Congress’ goals.215 The generic
drug market has escalated since the passage of the Act,216 yet market
incentives continue to spur pharmaceutical innovation.217 Since the Act’s
208. See id. at 593–95 (describing the abbreviated approval process for generic drugs).
209. Id. at 594; see also Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical
Settlements: The Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1013–14 (2010)
(discussing the Act’s goal of promoting competition).
210. See Knowles, supra note 199, at 1083.
211. Ted Hagelin, The Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement: Information on
Ice, Competition on Hold, 58 FLA. L. REV. 483, 504 (2006). More recently, the effectiveness of the
Hatch-Waxman Act is further increased by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271’s
safe harbor provision, which the Court has extended to “all uses of patented inventions that are
reasonably related to the development and submission of any information [to the FDA].” Rowe,
supra note 186, at 127 n.246 (quoting Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193,
202 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court’s intepretation of this provision allows
experimentation on patented drugs as long as the experimentation is related to “submission to the
FDA.” Id. Because of this expansive intepretation, patent holders “must tolerate the infringing
activities of competitors who conduct FDA approval tests prior to the expiration of the patent
terms.” Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimential Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 933 (2006).
212. See Mossinghoff, supra note 193, at 190.
213. ADELMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 906.
214. Only select provisions of the Hatch–Waxman Act have been discussed in this Note. As a
whole, the Hatch–Waxman Act is “one of the most complex disciplines in the entirety of legal
practice.” Id.
215. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 586.
216. See Laura W. Musselwhite & Jane Andrews, Protect Pharmaceutical Innovation, 328
SCI. 1354, 1354 (2010) (stating that in 2010, generic pharmaceuticals comprised 70% of the
pharmaceutical market); see also Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607 (stating that the
generic drug market has increased “from 19 percent of the total pharmaceutical market in 1984 to
more than 47 percent [in 2003]”).
217. Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607 (explaining that over $32 billion was spent
on research and development in 2003).
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inception, the increased presence of generic pharmaceuticals on the market
has saved the American healthcare system over $730 billion.218
Simultaneously, “the enactment of Hatch-Waxman . . . has helped unleash
unprecedented investment in new drug research and development, which in
turn has led to a period of unparalleled pharmaceutical innovation.”219
Regardless of the success of the Act, it continues to be a matter of
intense debate.220 Generic manufacturers believe that the Act impedes
generic entry into the marketplace.221 Pharmaceutical companies believe
that the Act does not adequately compensate innovators for the time lost to
the FDA approval process.222 Since its inception, the Hatch–Waxman Act
has been amended multiple times,223 and is still considered to be a work in
progress.224
VI. SOLVING THE HUMAN GENE PATENTING PROBLEM
Much can be learned from the successful implementation of both the
PVPA and the Hatch–Waxman Act, specifically in regards to research
exemptions of patented technologies. Despite these exemptions, both plant
research under the PVPA and prescription drug research under the Hatch–
Waxman Act have thrived at unprecedented levels.225 Regarding the
human gene patenting debate, the Advisory Committee of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services has suggested that infringement liability
exemptions should be implemented with respect to both medical
professionals and researchers.226 Allowing medical professionals to
perform genetic testing without infringement would undercut the financial
incentive of human gene research and ultimately result in decreased
investment in the pharmaceutical industry. However, the adverse effects of
a research exemption on a patent holder’s financial gain would be far less
threatening to the pharmaceutical industry. History has shown that
218. Musselwhite & Andrews, supra note 116, at 1354.
219. Pillman, India Needs Its Hatch-Waxman Act for Healthcare, DAILY NEWS & ANALYSIS,
May 15, 2009, http://www.dnaindia.com/money/column_india-needs-its-hatch-waxman-act-forhealthcare_1256132 (statement of Kathleen Jaeger, President and CEO of Generic Pharmaceutical
Association) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits:
Antitrust Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 750–51 (2002) (discussing an
increased number of lawsuits resulting from the Hatch–Waxman Act).
221. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607.
222. See Knowles, supra note 199, at 1083–84.
223. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)); see also Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)); Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub.
L. No. 100-670, 102 Stat. 3971 (1988) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
224. See Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 193, at 607–08 (discussing what types of reform
efforts to Hatch-Waxman might be successful).
225. See supra Part V.
226. See SACGHS, supra note 100, at 94–95.
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pharmaceutical economics can coexist with research exemptions on
patented technologies.227 Legislation that allows research on patented
human genes yet still allows infringement suits for any commercialization
based on this research, would simultaneously promote the interests of both
the consumer and the industry.
Many other ideas for how to fix the human gene patenting problem
have been suggested, such as: compulsory licensing of patented genetic
material,228 promotion of increased transparency in licensing standards,229
and restriction of the scope of patent protection.230 While these suggestions
adequately protect the interests of consumers and researchers discussed in
Parts II and III of this Note, they fail to effectively protect the interests of
patent holders. In many of these academic proposals, the interests of the
pharmaceutical industry have been largely ignored. Legislation that reduces
patent holder rights will deter innovation, so provisions benefitting patent
holders must be included. Furthermore, unless proposed legislation
provides tangible benefits to the pharmaceutical industry, it is unlikely to
be voted into law.231 Similar to the Hatch–Waxman Act, the ideal human
gene patent legislation would provide benefits to both the consumer and
the industry.
Several legislative courses of action would compensate the
pharmaceutical industry for allowing researchers to be exempted from
227. See supra Part V.
228. See Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg.
18413, 18413–15 (proposed Apr. 11, 2005) (suggesting that compulsory nonexclusive or exclusive
licensing procedures would benefit public welfare); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF GENETIC INVENTIONS 9 (2006), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/38/36198812.pdf (discussing implementing broad licensing
requirements for research and investigation purposes). Generally, compulsory licensing would allow
use of a patented invention if the use serves some beneficial public policy. See Jacqueline Lipton,
Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 163–64 (2004).
229. See SACGHS, supra note 100, at 99 (discussing how transparency in licensing
requirements provides a degree of certainty to the research community).
230. See Marisa Noelle Pins, Note, Impeding Access to Quality Patient Care and Patient
Rights: How Myriad Genetics’ Gene Patents Are Unknowingly Killing Cancer Patients and How to
Calm the Ripple Effect, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 377, 412–13 (2010) (discussing the possibility of
limiting the scope of patents associated with certain genetic conditions).
231. See Dan Eggen, The Health Sector Has Donated Millions to Lawmakers, WASH. POST,
Mar. 8, 2009, at A09 (discussing campaign contributions made by the pharmaceutical industry and
expressing “concern . . . that money is buying influence and policy changes” (citing Jerry Flanagan,
Consumer Watchdog healthcare advocate) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also AMS. FOR
CAMPAIGN REFORM, FACT SHEET: MONEY IN POLITICS & PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (2010), available at
http://www.acrreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Fact-Sheet-Pharmaceutical-Money-inPolitics1.pdf (stating that the pharmaceutical industry has invested nearly $2 billion in lobbying and
contributions to Congressional campaigns). See generally Filipe R. Campante, Redistribution in a
Model of Voting and Campaign Contributions 32–33 (Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No.
RWP07-045, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1019020
(finding a link between voting and campaign contributions); Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Geoff
Edwards, Does Private Money Buy Public Policy? Campaign Contributions and Regulatory
Outcomes in Telecommunications, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 547, 569 (2007) (finding that
“private money in the form of campaign contributions can influence public policy outcomes”).
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infringement liability. The most drastic measure would be a patent term
extension for human gene patents. Research exemptions, medical
professional exemptions, compulsory licensing, or any of the other
proposed courses of action would result in decreased profits for patent
holders. In order to effectively promote innovation despite this decrease in
patent holder rights, the ideal pro-pharmaceutical legislation would extend
the period of patent exclusivity. This could be done either by adjusting the
start date of the patent term232 or by adding years to the end of the term in a
manner similar to the Hatch–Waxman legislation. Extending the patent
term by several years could adequately compensate the patent holder for
these lost profits.
Another option is to provide the pharmaceutical industry with increased
tax credit incentives. On December 17, 2010, the Tax Relief,
Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010
went into effect.233 This Act extends, through the end of 2011, the active
period of an earlier tax credit designed to refund businesses for their
research and development spending.234 This tax credit was initially
implemented in 1981 and has been extended fourteen times since its initial
enactment.235 For years, the pharmaceutical industry has been lobbying for
Congress to make this tax credit permanent,236 arguing that it would
promote job growth and provide a level of certainty for investors.237 In
providing the pharmaceutical industry with a permanent or increased
financial incentive, the tax credit may counterbalance the concessions that
the general public is demanding of the pharmaceutical industry.
A third option is to increase government funding of private research. In
1988, Congress passed the Advanced Technology Program (ATP)238 “to
foster cooperation among government, industry, and academia to facilitate
the generation of new technologies and techniques for the commercial

232. A patent is valid for twenty years from the time of filing. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
For human gene patents, beginning the patent term at the time of issuance (as opposed to the time of
filing) would extend the term of patent exclusivity in a manner that would adequately compensate
inventors for decreased patent holder rights associated with compulsory licensing or research
exemptions.
233. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (2010) (to be codified as amended at I.R.C. § 41).
234. Id.
235. See Karen Axelton, Will the R&D Tax Credit Be Extended Again?, NETWORK SOLUTIONS
SMALL BUS. BLOG (Apr. 21, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://www.networksolutions.com/smallbusiness/
2011/04/will-the-rd-tax-credit-be-extended-again/.
236. See Erik Greb, Is PhRMA Credible About the R&D Tax Credit?, PHARMATECH TALK (Oct.
4, 2010, 9:49 AM), http://blog.pharmtech.com/2010/10/04/is-phrma-credible-about-the-rd-taxcredit (discussing “the pharmaceutical industry’s legislative priorities”).
237. See Grant Gross, Obama Calls for Permanent R&D Tax Credit, NETWORK WORLD (Sept.
8, 2010, 4:23 PM), http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/090810-obama-calls-for-permanentrd.html (discussing the benefits to the pharmaceutical industry of a permanent R&D tax credit).
238. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
1115, repealed by America Competes Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572, 593.
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market.”239 Through ATP, large pharmaceutical companies were able to
secure federal funds to offset research and development costs. At its height,
ATP was funded at $431 million per year.240 Despite the overwhelming
success of the program,241 by 2006, Congress had decreased funding to
ATP by over 40%.242 In 2007, Congress replaced ATP with the
Technology Innovation Program (TIP),243 which federally funds innovative
research in “small and medium-sized businesses.”244 In 2009, TIP was
funded at $65 million,245 far less than federal funding of private research
during the peak ATP years. While TIP may not discourage innovation, it
does nothing to incentivize innovation at large pharmaceutical companies.
Allowing large companies to reap the benefits of public funding would
help offset the innovation deterrence caused by the passage of proconsumer legislation.
CONCLUSION
The recent Myriad I and Myriad II decisions have brought the human
gene patenting debate to center stage. By ruling in a manner that is
inconsistent with both case law and USPTO policy, the Myriad I court took
the first step toward effectuating change in the human gene patenting field.
By failing to reach a consensus on the reasoning behind, or scope of,
human gene patenting, the Myriad II court has intensified the need for
certainty in the gene patenting field. Furthermore, the United States
government’s participation in the appeals procedure indicates the necessity
of a change to human gene patenting policy. The debate among
researchers, consumers, and pharmaceutical companies is exacerbated by
the moral and ethical implications of the field. In this context in particular,
spurring innovation is essential, not just because of the intimate
relationship between innovation and national prosperity, but also because
of the direct impact of innovation on consumer health. Legislation
curtailing patent holder rights should therefore simultaneously stimulate
innovation.
The Hatch–Waxman Act provides the best example of patent-related
legislation that simultaneously benefits seemingly competing interests.246
While pro-consumer regulation of human gene patents has been
239. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-36 SPR, THE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
PROGRAM 1 (2007) [hereinafter ATP].
240. Id. at 3.
241. WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22815, THE TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION
PROGRAM 3 (2008) [hereinafter TIP] (finding that “ATP shortened R&D cycles by half and
accelerated technological progress . . . and increased private sector investment”).
242. See ATP, supra note 239, at 3.
243. America Competes Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-69, 121 Stat. 572, 593 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 278n (2006)).
244. See TIP, supra note 241, at 5.
245. Id. at 1.
246. See supra Section V.B.
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extensively discussed, pro-pharmaceutical provisions to any proposed
legislation have been largely overlooked.247 Fortunately, there are many
ways to continue to incentivize innovation while simultaneously reducing
patent holder rights, including extending patent terms, increasing or
stabilizing tax incentives, and increasing the scope of federal funding of
private research. Ideally, increased concessions on the part of the
pharmaceutical industry should be paired with a correlated increase in
benefits afforded to the industry. Large concessions, such as compulsory
nonexclusive licensing, should be paired with large incentives, such as
extended patent terms. Minor concessions, such as a narrow research
exemption, should be paired with minor incentives, such as a slight
increase to federal funding of private research.
If the histories of plant and pharmaceutical drug patents teach us
anything, it is this: there is no magic bullet. Finding an adequate solution to
the problem is a lengthy process: both plant and drug patent legislation
have been through multiple amendments to get where they are today.
Congressional human gene patent legislation that is simultaneously proconsumer and pro-pharmaceutical is the best way to start down the path to
a compromise that consumers, researchers, and the pharmaceutical industry
will all find acceptable.

247. See supra Part VI.
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